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The FETUS: 
Acorn or Oak Tree? 
by S. Timmerman Tepel 
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There is perhaps more controversy in 
1976 about abortion than ever before. 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
spoke to certain issues and plainly de-
cided to ignore others. Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179(1973), (decided the same 
day as Roe), did nothing to clarify the 
ambiguous quality of Roe. Many people 
think there are many unanswered ques-
tions remaining from these decisions; 
furthermore, there is a large minority 
pushing for a constitutional amendment 
making all abortions illegal. 
The Supreme Court in Roe/Doe 
neatly side-stepped a firm answer to the 
question: what is a fetus? Is a woman's 
biology her destiny? Or, is a fetus an ap-
pendix easily removed when it causes 
trouble? Hundreds of years of produc-
tive thinking by our most brilliant 
philosophers hasn't really solved much; 
however, the time is fast approaching 
when definite answers will be necessary. 
Our ability to control our bodies man-
dates a clear definition of the fetus' status 
in the very near future. 
I. Before Roe v. Wade 
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 
P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), was 
the first reported decision to declare an 
abortion statute unconstitutional. Refer-
ring to Griswold v.Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965), the California Supreme 
Court concluded that the right to choose 
whether to bear children was a woman's 
fundamental right based on the right of 
privacy or liberty in matters related to 
marriage and sex. This case was fol-
lowed by a district court decision in Unit-
ed States v. VUitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 
(D. D.C. 1969). Vuitch ruled that the 
phrase in the District of Columbia's abor-
tion statute referring to the necessity of 
danger to the mother's life and health be 
eliminated. Then, inBabbitz v. McCann, 
310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), in 
Wisconsin, the district court declared the 
statute unconstitutional in respect to an 
unquickened fetus; the court cited the 
right to privacy. 
Next came the district court decisions 
of Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 
(N.D. Tex. 1970), and Doe v. Bolton, 
319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), 
both cases holding parts of Texas' and 
Georgia's statutes unconstitutional. 
[The Doe] decision [at the federal dis-
trict court level, 319 F. Supp. 1048 
(N.D. Ga. 1970), did] not stand for the 
fundamental right of a woman to 
choose whether to bear a child. The 
Court made it clear that it was unwill-
ing to declare that such a right reposes 
unbounded in anyone individual. 
Clearly, the decision to abort a formed 
embryo is not purely a private one af-
fecting only husband and wife. The 
decision affects not only husband and 
wife, but also the state and the fetus as 
well. A Survey of the Present Statu-
tory and Case Law on Abortion: The 
Contradictions and the Problems, 
1972 U ILL. L.F. 177, 187 (hereinafter 
cited as Survey on Abortion) 
That state courts were not giving free 
rein to the concept of the right of privacy, 
alluded to in Doe, is even more apparent 
in Rosen v. Louisana State Bd. of Medi-
calExaminers, 318F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. 
La. 1970). The Rosen decision em-
phasized the state's right to assign a 
value to fetal life. The court stated: "We 
do not recognize the asserted right of a 
woman to choose to destroy the embryo 
or fetus she carries as being so rooted in 
the traditions and collective conscience 
so as to be ranked as 'Fundamental'." 
Id. at 1232. Other cases, in the period 
prior to the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Roe and Doe, demonstrate a pattem 
of much disagreement and confusion 
among the states in their decisions 
about abortion. 
As evidence of this confusion we find 
that-during the pre-Roe period-
many states had abortion laws which 
were inconsistent with their feticide stat-
utes. Concerning the effect of liberalized 
abortion laws on individual states' 
feticide statutes, "[i]t is inconsistent ... 
to allow all abortions but to punish a 
third-party wrongdoer for an act which 
has the same end result-death of the 
fetus." Survey on Abortion, supra at 
191-92. Two California decisions reflect 
this conflict: Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 
Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. 
Rptr. 481 (1970), and People v. 
Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621,176 P.2d 
92 (1947). In Keeler, the district appeals 
court first held that a viable fetus is a 
human being for the purpose of 
Califomia's homicide statutes. See gen-
erally The Killing of a Viable Fetus Is 
Murder, 30 MD. L. REv. 137 (1970). 
This decision was in line with Chevez, 
which held that a viable fetus in the act 
of being born was a human being. 
However, Keeler was overruled, the 
decision being based on the fact that 
there was no feticide statute, per se, in 
California, and therefore, there was no 
murder. "Keeler presents the paradoxi-
cal situation in which an unborn, 21-
week child is protected from its own 
mother and her doctor but is not pro-
tected from a wrongdoer who malici-
ously takes its life." Knecht, supra at 
193. 
The controversy which eventually led 
up to the Roe/DOle decisions caused as 
much comment outside the courts as in. 
In 1972, Roger Wertheimer attempted 
to give definition to the various trends of 
thinking. 
According to the liberal, the fetus 
should be disposable upon the 
mother's request until it is viable; 
thereafter, it may be destroyed only to 
save the mother's life. To an extreme 
liberal the fetus is always like an ap-
pendix, and may be destroyed upon 
demand anytime before its birth. A 
moderate view is that until viability the 
fetus should be disposable if it is the 
result of felonious intercourse, or if the 
mother's or child's physical or mental 
health would probably be gravely im-
paired .... For the extreme conserva-
tive, the fetus, once conceived, may 
not be destroyed for any reason short 
of saving the mother's life. 
Since these definitions help not at all 
in coming to one conclusion about abor-
tion, Mr. Wertheimer attempts-and 
sometimes succeeds~to demonstrate 
that all these separate groups are not so 
dissimilar as seems apparent at first 
glance. He pokes fun at them all, con-
cluding that perhaps the only difference 
between birth and viability is the 
" ... quite inessential one of geog-
raphy." 
Perhaps the remarks most indicative 
of Wertheimer's "conservative's" posi-
tion came from Pope Paul in 1968. 
In conformity with these landmarks in 
the human and Christian vision of 
marriage, we must once again declare 
that the direct interruption of the 
generative process already begun, 
and, above all, directly willed and pro-
cured abortion, even if for therapeutic 
reasons, are to be absolutely excluded 
as elicit means of regulating birth. 
POPE PAUL IV, ENCYCLICAL ON BIRTH 
CONTROL 178 
Around the same time as the Pope's 
"Encyclical", feminists began to be 
vocal in their remarks in favor of Werth-
eimer's "appendix" theory. One aspect 
of abortion legislation particularly enrag-
ing to feminists was that, at the time of 
most statutes' enactment, most legisla-
tures were comprised almost entirely of 
men. Many feminists believed that a 
man-and certainly not a body of 
men-had no right to tell a woman 
what she could or could not do to or with 
her own body. This has been described 
as the double irony: to be punished for 
being a woman under a law created in 
the absence of women's assent. See 
Comment, Isolating the Male Bias 
Against Reform of Abortion Legislation 
10 SANTA CLARA LA~ER 301 (1970) 
(hereinafter cited as Isolating the Male 
Bias). 
This is the background which brought 
us to the Supreme Court's Roe/Doe de-
cisions. The argument for and against 
the fetus as person goes round and 
round. Perhaps the thrust of the problem 
is that logic is of no assistance; the de-
termination of the fetus' status cannot be 
grounded wholly in logic. If we find our-
selves taking a firm decision on the abor-
tion issue, it's because we are looking at 
a fact situation in a certain way-not 
because the fact situation is that way. As 
Wertheimer so succinctly put it: " ... 
there isn't much we can do with a fetus; 
either we let it out or we do it in." 
II Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton 
Without Griswold v. Connecticut, 
supra, Roe/Doe could not have hap-
pened, or, certainly not with such ease. 
Griswold held a statute making the use 
of contraceptives a criminal offense an 
unconstitutional invasion of the right of 
privacy of married persons. The Court 
found that the Fourteenth Amendment 
concept of liberty protects those per-
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sonal rights that are fundamental, and is 
not confined to the specific terms of the 
Bill of Rights. This concept of the right to 
privacy set the stage for the Roe/Doe de-
cisions. 
In Roe the Court held that the Texas 
abortion statutes prohibiting abortion at 
any stage of pregnancy except to save 
the life of the mother were unconstitu-
tional. Additionally, it held that during 
the first trimester of the pregnancy the 
state has no interest in the abortion deci-
sion; that at the end of the first trimester 
the state may regulate abortion proce-
dure in ways reasonably related to ma-
ternal health; and that after viability the 
state may regulate and even proscribe 
abortion unless necessary for maternal 
life or health. One would think that this 
decision was flexible enough to please 
everyone; on the contrary, it pleased 
almost no one. Those who wished for an 
absolute right to abortion-trimesters 
and viability be damned-were disap-
pointed. Those who hoped that abortion 
would be declared absolutely illegal 
were disappointed. And, in fact, as we 
shall see further on, Roe did nothing to 
quell the controversy. 
The Supreme Court in Roe made a 
thorough historical search of abortion 
law before reaching its decision. The 
major questions were whether the right 
to personal privacy includes an abortion 
decision and, inextricably related to that, 
whether the fetus is a "person" under 
the Constitution. The Court concluded 
that the right to privacy does include the 
right to have an abortion; but they held 
this right to be a qualified one. The Court 
stated that this right became limited 
when the fetus became "viable". 
[I]t is reasonable and appropriate for a 
State to decide that at some point in 
time another interest, that of the 
health of the mother or that of poten-
tial human life, becomes significantly 
involved. The woman's privacy is no 
longer sole and any right of privacy 
she possesses must be measured ac-
cordingly. Roe, supra at 159. 
The Court ducked the issue of deter-
mining when life begins, stating that via-
bility usually occurs by the twenty-eighth 
week, but might occur as early as the 
twenty-fourth week. Id. at 160. After 
surveying the common law history, the 
Court concluded that " ... the unborn 
have never been recognized in the law as 
persons in the whole sense." Id. at 162. 
Discussing the fetus in terms of "poten-
tial life", the Court concluded that the 
State's legitimate interest arises at viabil-
ity, when the fetus has the capability of 
meaningful life outside its mother's 
body.ld. at 163. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, 
stated that "[t]he decision here to break 
pregnancy into three distinct terms and 
to outline the permissible restrictions the 
State may impose in each one, for 
example, partakes more of judicial legis-
lation than it does of a determination of 
the intent of the drafters of the Four-
teenthAmendment." Id. at 174. Insome 
ways these remarks have evolved into 
the words of a prophet of doom; the 
Court's division of the pregnancy into 
trimesters with the state's interest begin-
ning at "viability" has been the source of 
abortion controversy since 1973. 
InDoe, decided the same day as Roe, 
the Supreme Court reiterated its position 
in Roe by declaring that a pregnant 
woman has no absolute constitutional 
right to abortion on demand. Further, 
the Court stated that the Georgia statute 
still permitting a physician to perform an 
abortion only after-using his best clin-
ical judgment-he determined that the 
abortion was necessary was not uncon-
stitutionally vague. "Physician's best 
clinical judgment" was defined to include 
every factor relevant to his/her patient's 
well-being. However, the Court did rule 
that the requirement of the Georgia stat-
ute that all abortions take place in an 
accredited hospital was not reasonably 
related to the statute's purpose. 
The Court further concluded that a 
statute could not require a hospital 
committee's approval, nor could it re-
quire the concurrence of two other 
physicians. And finally, it held that a 
state abortion statute could not restrict 
abortions within that state to residents of 
that state. In Roe, the Court attacked the 
general issue of the legality of abortion; 
in Doe, it defined the limits of the indi-
vidual state's permissible involvement. 
In respect to the "physician's best 
judgment", the Court stated that " ... 
the medical judgment may be exercised 
in the light of all factors-physical, 
emotional, psychological, familial, and 
the woman's age-relevant to the 
well-being of the patient. All these fac-
tors may relate to health. This allows the 
attending physician the room he needs 
to make his best medical judgment." 
Doe, supra at 192. The Court declared 
the hospital requirement invalid because 
it failed to exclude the first trimester; Roe 
had held that the state had no interest 
in an abortion decision during the first 
trimester. As to the Georgia statute's re-
quirement of two concurring doctors, 
the Court stated that "[ilf a physician is 
licensed by the State, he is recognized by 
the State as capable of exercising ac-
ceptable clinical judgment. ... ReqUired 
acquiescence by co-practitioners ... 
unduly infringes on the physician's right 
to practice." Id. at 199. 
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opin-
ion, added that the Georgia statute's 
medical supervision violated the pa-
tient's right of privacy inherent in her 
choice of her own physician. This 
echoed his remarks in Roe concerning 
the right to privacy. "The right of 
privacy-the right to care for one's 
health and person and to seek out a 
physician of one's own choice protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment-
becomes only a matter of theory, not a 
reality, when a multiple-physician-
approval system is mandated by the 
State." Id. at 219. 
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in 
Roe/Doe is perhaps the most interesting 
philosophically. In an attempt to synthe-
size the thinking of our time toward 
abortion, he related his remarks to the 
thoughts of many philosophers before 
him. He quotes from Mr. Justice Clark: 
To say that life is present at conception 
is to give recognition to the potential, 
rather than the actual. The unfertilized 
egg has life, and if fertilized, it takes 
on human proportions. ... The 
phenomenon of life takes time to de-
velop, and until it is actually present, it 
cannot be destroyed. Its interruption 
prior to formation would hardly be 
homicide, and ... society does not 
regard it as such. The rites of Baptism 
are not required when a miscarriage 
occurs. No prosecutor has ever re-
turned a murder indictment charging 
the taking of the life of a fetus. This 
would not be the case if the fetus con-
stituted human life. Id. at 217-18, 
quoting Clark, Religion, Morality, and 
Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 
2 LOYOLA UL. REV. 1,9-10 (1969) 
Justice Douglas' comments seem much 
a part of the mainstream of philoso-
phers writing about abortion for the 
last fifteen hundred years. 
One aspect of Doe of particular inter-
est was that the Court held that physi-
cians had standing to sue, and that they 
presented a justiciable controversy. In a 
brief Amicus CUriae, the American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
American Medical Women's Associa-
tion, American Psychiatric Association, 
New York Academy of Medicine, e1. al. 
presented their case. Their brief discus-
ses the differences between spontane-
ous and induced abortion: "The proce-
dure of induced abortion differs from 
spontaneous not in the result, nor in the 
underlying reason for the abortion, but 
primarily in its being conscious and voli-
tional." Brief for Doe as Amicus Curiae 
at 13, Doe v. Bolton, supra. The brief 
goes on to say that no law requires a pa-
tient to seek-or a physician to 
provide-treatment to prevent spon-
taneous abortion. Id. at 14. The physi-
cians' brief concludes: "The trou ble with 
abortion statutes is that they reveal an 
understandable, but nonetheless sub-
stantial ignorance of how medicine is 
practiced. As much could be expected if 
physicians drafted statutes stipulating 
how attorneys should practice law. At-
torneys would be required to do 'justice' 
to their clients, particularly physician-
clients, and failure to do so would result 
in ten years' imprisonment." Id. at 56. 
The physicians' remarks seem quite 
similar to the feminist idea discussed ear-
lier. Isolating the Male Bias, supra. There 
the author's argument was that since 
women are the ones whose bodies con-
tain the fetus, they are really the 
ones-and perhaps the only ones-
to decide what to do with those fetuses. 
In the physicians' brief, the doctors are 
arguing that, since they are the ones 
called upon to perform abortions, 
they-and perhaps only they-
should determine the procedures under 
which those abortions are performed. 
Certainly Roe/Doe created a violent 
upheaval in courts and legislatures all 
over the country. However, at first, it 
seemed that, at last, there was some firm 
ground to stand on when considering 
abortion. On the contrary, as the months 
have passed since those decisions in 
1973, the ground gets mushier and 
mushier. Although solving some prob-
lems regarding abortion legislation, the 
decisions caused many more. Most im-
portantly two "armed camps", mostly 
women, began to be publicly vocal. 
Neither was pleased with Roe/Doe. On 
the one hand were the feminists who felt 
they'd been given a placebo: what they 
wanted was an absolute right to abor-
tion; what they got was a "qualified 
right" . A right so qualified as to be hardly 
a right at all. On the other hand were the 
"Right to Lifers". They wanted an abso-
lute right for the fetus, Le., the fetus as 
"person" from the moment of concep-
tion. What they too got was a "qualified 
right" for the fetus. And so the fight was 
on! 
III. After Roe and Doe 
A. The Courts 
Aside from the dissatisfaction created 
in feminists and "right-to-lifers", Roe/ 
Doe did not bring an end to the abortion 
controversy in the courts. There were a 
number of unresolved questions remain-
ing. 
One problem arose when a layman, 
not a physician, challenged the Indiana 
statute as unconstitutional. Cheaney v. 
Indiana, 410o.S. 991 (1973). There the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari for 
want of standing of the petitioner. His 
argument was that if state legislation re-
quired abortions to be performed by 
licensed doctors, it would make abor-
tions available only to rich people. The 
Court concluded that there was no de-
nial of equal protection. However, the 
dissenting opinion in May v. State, 254 
Ark. 194, 492 S.W.2d 888 (1973), 
maintained that a statute limiting the 
grounds for abortion must be uncon-
stitutional as a unit, and that a layman 
had standing to challenge the statute as 
the statute did not differentiate between 
abortions performed by doctors and 
those performed by laymen. 
In People v. Bricker, 389 Mich. 524, 
208 N. W.2d 172 (1973), the court held 
that a statute prohibiting abortion unless 
necessary to preserve a woman's life was 
valid in its application to laymen. How-
ever, in State v. Hultgren, 295 Minn. 
299,204 N. W.2d 197 (1973), the court 
found that since there was no distinction 
in the statute between laymen and 
physicians, the statute was unenforce-
able under Roe and Doe. The court did, 
however, comment that a statute specif-
ically prohibiting abortions by laymen 
would be proper and desirable. In State 
v. Strance, 84 N.M. 670, 506 P.2d 
1217 (1973), the court held the statute 
unconstitutional as applied to abortions 
performed by licensed physicians; how-
ever, they stated that the statute was 
constitutional as applied to laymen. 
Another issue that arose after Roe/ 
Doe was the constitutionality of the 
phrase "necessary to preserve her life." 
In Nelson v. Planned Parenthood Cen-
ter of Tucson, Inc., 19 Ariz. App. 142, 
505 P.2d 580 (1973), the court held that 
there was no unconstitutional vagueness 
in that phrase. In respect to that phrase, 
the court in Nelson stated that having 
that restriction in the statute-
"necessary to preserve her life" -did 
not unconstitutionally discriminate 
against poor women for the reason that 
wealthy women were presumably free to 
travel outside the state. The court also re-
jected the contention that the inclusion 
of that phrase in the statute constituted 
an establishment of religion and violated 
the plaintiffs' religious liberty. The court 
stated that sanctity for life is not only 
based on religious concepts. 
The abortion case of most Significance 
in 1975, and perhaps 1976 as well, isthe 
Massachusetts case of Commonwealth 
v. Edelin, HUMAN PROD. & THE LAW REP. 
I-A-21, at 74-75. In Edelin the prosecu-
tion was not based on abortion; rather it 
was a manslaughter charge. Dr. Edelin, 
by hysterotomy, removed a fetus-
while performing an abortion-from a 
woman; the fetus' age was estimated at 
from twenty to twenty-eight weeks. 
There was much conflicting testimony in 
the case, especially concerning whether 
the fetus was born alive or whether Dr. 
Edelin let the baby boy die by doing 
nothing. The Massachusetts statute 
concerning abortion had been found 
unconstitutional under Roe/Doe, and 
the legislature 'had not written a new 
one. 
Judge McGuire, in his instructions to 
the jury, Id. at I-C-132, discussed the 
meaning of the word "person", stating 
that" ... one ofthe essential elements of 
the crime of manslaughter . .. is the 
death of a person." Directing the jury as 
to how the Constitution uses that word, 
Judge McGuire told them that "person" 
has " ... applicability only postnatally. 
That means after birth. None of the defi-
nitions [in the Constitution] indicates 
with any assurance that it has any possi-
ble prenatal application." Id. Further-
more, Judge McGuire directed that: "A 
fetus is not a person, and not the subject 
of an indictment for manslaughter. In 
order for a person to exist, he or she 
must be born." Id. at 133. Despite these 
instructions, and the conflicting evi-
dence, the jury found Kenneth Edelin 
guilty of manslaughter. The case is cur-
rentlybeing considered by the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court, on appeal. 
The Edelin decision set off fireworks. 
Calling the trial a "witchhunt", Edelin 
said that "a lot of things came together 
for the prosecution in my case. They got 
a black physician and they got a woman 
more than twenty weeks' pregnant and 
they got a fetus in the mortuary." It is 
clear from Edelin that the decisions 
reached in Roe/Doe did not end our 
problems with abortion. David M. Al-
pern stated in Newsweek magazine: 
Indeed, the final legal verdict on Ede-
lin may be less important than the 
philosophical discussions his case 
provides. The adversary system of 
the criminal courts is not the place to 
define abortion, to define viability, or 
to define the moral issues of abortion,' 
says Dr. Kenneth J. Ryan ... chief of 
staff at the Boston Hospital for 
Women. 
Interestingly, the legality of Edelin is not 
at issue; what has concerned people 
writing about the deCision is the ethics/ 
morality question. Modern science is 
complicating the situation daily; the var-
ious forms of mid to late term abortion, 
with the various accompanying risks of 
fetal survival, coupled with improve-
ment in mechanical means of keeping 
prematurely "born" fetuses alive, raise 
issues of morality and ethics, not issues 
that can be decided by the courts. 
As Margot Hentoff says: "What de-
termines whether the thing will be 
treated as an aborted fetus or a prema-
ture infant is whether it is wanted or 
not-a rather odd way to make a de-
termination of humanity." She believes 
that the " ... real question abortion 
raises now and forever ... [is whether] 
... killing for utilitarian principles [is] 
morally acceptable to humanists and 
where should it end?" She argues that 
taking the life of the fetus to preserve the 
freedom of the mother to be unbur-
dened by a child is merely the "Ethics of 
Convenience" . She likens abortions 
performed after the first trimester to in-
fanticide: "... we have in modern 
western society rejected infanticide as a 
solution to social problems." Her final 
argument is that the burden should not 
be placed upon doctors like Edelin. 
Perhaps doctors are the least 
equipped to make such judgments. 
Their training has educated them to 
go against their own early instincts-
to cut into flesh, to inflict pain, to muti-
late in order to cure. In a way, they are 
trained to be less susceptible to things 
than the rest of us. To doctors, if the 
law says an unborn child is only fetal 
tissue, it is fetal tissue. Tell thern to 
maintain life in its most tortured form, 
and they maintain life. 
The issues Ms. Hentoff raises are im-
portant ones. It seems that those to de-
cide our stand on abortion need to be 
the people, not the courts. This is not to 
say that there are not narrow aspects of 
the abortion issue that should be left to 
the courts. There are a few. 
One is the issue of consent, of which 
there are two types recurring as a prob-
lem in the cases: minor's consent to 
abortion, and father's consent to abor-
tion. In respect to the father, the cases 
are fairly consistent. There are, however, 
two types of paternal consent: that of the 
married father and that of the putative 
father. Since Roe declared a woman's 
"qualified right" to an abortion, where 
has that left that father if he wants the 
woman to bear the child? In Coe v. Gers-
tein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974), 
celt. denied, 417 U.S. 279 (1974), the 
court found that the statutory require-
ment of spousal consent was unconstitu-
tional. This decision supported the deci-
sion in Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 
(Fla. App. 1973), celt. denied, 415 U.S. 
958 (1974). Jones " ... apparently 
presented that court with a matter of first 
impression in the nation relative to pa-
ternal rights of adult unwed fathers in the 
abortion decision. The Jones court cited 
Roe and Doe in asserting that the essen-
tial and underlying factor in its own deci-
sion was the maternal right of privacy." 
G. Swan. Abortion on Maternal De-
mand: Paternal Support Liability Impli-
cations, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 243, 253-54 
(1975). In Jones a putative father was 
denied by the court any legal veto over 
an abortion; the court declared the right 
of privacy to be a personal one. 
In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. 
Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 
1975), the court held invalid parts of a 
statute requiring consent of a 
spouse-or the consent of a parent of a 
minor-but they did not reach the issue 
of the consent of the putative father. In 
Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 
1974), the court was presented with an 
estranged father who testified that he 
wanted custody of the child, to support it 
and arrange for its care. Despite this, the 
court held he had no veto. 
In respect to Doe v. Doe, Ms. Lise 
Kenworthy remarks that one of the 
court's problems is that: 
Courts have been reluctant to become 
involved in marital relations and pro-
tect one spouse from the act of the 
other. . .. More specifically, assum-
ing that the husband has an interest 
which is entitled to judicial protection, 
the prospect of ordering a woman not 
to procure an abortion involves seri-
ous enforcement problems and pro-
vokes the question of how one would 
punish a woman if she disobeyed the 
decree. 
In this case the court reasoned that 
since the state could not regulate the 
abortion decision before the fetus be-
comes viable, then the state could not 
come to the aid of the husband with au-
thority it did not possess. Doe v. Doe, 
supra at 132. 
The Supreme Court finally reached 
the issue of consent-both spousal and 
parental-in Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 
2831 (1976). In Planned Parenthood, 
Justice Blackmun's opinion, expressing 
the Court's unanimous view, held that 
the spousal consent provision in a Mis-
souri statute was unconstitutional. The 
reasoning was based on the fact that 
since the state could not regulate or 
proscribe abortions in the first trimester, 
then the state could not delegate to a 
spouse an authority it did not have itself. 
Unfortunately, the issue of the consent 
of the putative father was not before the 
court; however, it does seem likely that if 
the Supreme Court does not grant the 
privilege of consent to a spouse, then the 
consent privilege would not be granted 
to the unmarried father. 
Doe v. Doe raised a question in re-
spect to the father's liability for support. 
Judith Zernich suggests that "Doe has 
produced the anomalous situation of 
granting the woman's physician substan-
tive rights superior to those of the 
father." Yet, if the woman chooses not 
to have the abortion, the father has the 
duty to support that child. The stand 
taken in Doe seems difficult; a father re-
questing custody and offering support is 
refused his right to make the mother 
bear his child, yet had she chosen to bear 
it, he would have had to support it. Ms. 
Zernich argues that " ... if the father is 
willing to assume custody and support, 
and if the conception had been a desired 
one, perhaps requiring a full-term preg-
nancy is justified." She concludes by 
acknowledging that the obstacles in solv-
ing this problem are formidable, but not 
sufficiently formidable to totally ignore 
the father's rights. Elimination of pater-
nalliability for child support may be logi-
cally and equitably necessary; or, alter-
natively, recognition of the paternal veto 
may be the answer. Swan, supra at 272. 
A minor's right to an abortion without 
her parent's consent has frequently been 
a problem to the courts. Mr. Fred Hiatt 
would argue that since " ... permission 
from a minor's parent is routinely ac-
cepted as informed consent ... " today 
(in respect to experimentation on the 
child as subject), the child ought to have 
the right to control the abortion decision. 
The courts since Roe/Doe mostly agree. 
In State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 
530 P.2d 260 (1975), the Washington 
Supreme Court invalidated that state's 
consent statute. The court found that the 
statute too broadly encumbered the 
unmarried woman's right to abortion, 
and that it discriminated between simi-
larly situated groups of women. The 
lower court's decision turned on in-
formed consent. The Rorida court in 
Coe v. Gerstein, supra, held that " ... a 
pregnant woman under 18 years of age 
cannot, under the law, be distinguished 
from one over 18 years of age in refer-
ence to 'fundamental,' 'personal' con-
stitutional rights." at 698. Most courts 
agree. "Data indicates that fear of pa-
rental reactions may drive the pregnant 
minor to run away from home, seek 
criminal abortion, attempt self-abortion, 
or even suicide. An absolute parental 
consent requirement would often result 
in denial or detrimental delay of needed 
medical care. Thus parental consent re-
quirements are likely to be counter-
productive. Furthermore, for reasons of 
health and social policy, it is not con-
structive to allow the imposition of com-
pulsory pregnancy as punishment by 
parents. As the Koome court reasoned, 
" ... parental prerogatives ... are not 
absolute and must yield to fundamental 
rights of the child or important interests 
of the State ... and the State's interest in 
restricting minors' access to abortions 
[is] inadequate to satisfy the require-
ments of due process under Roe and 
Doe." 530 P.2d at 264. 
The Supreme Court agrees. The re-
cently decided Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, held 
the statute's parental consent provision 
unconstitutional since the state did not 
have the constitutional authority to give 
a third party an absolute, possibly 
arbitrary, veto over the decision of the 
physician and his patient. 
B. The People 
Most of the post Roe/Doe furor is not 
taking place in the courts; more people 
with no real legal orientation are writing, 
thinking-and shouting-about abor-
tion than ever before. Until recently, the 
practice of abortion was not taboo, only 
the mention of it. Now that the practice is 
neither taboo nor illegal, the mention of 
it is no longer taboo. Is the wish to be rid 
of "Eve's burden" -abortion-a 
needed instrument of social policy? De-
spite Roe/Doe, the people do not agree. 
If we accept the underlying dictum of 
medical ethics as "Do no harm", is there 
a way out of the abortion dilemma by 
doing no harm? Or are we searching 
merely for a way to do the least 
harm-to the woman, to the father, to 
the parents of a minor, and to the fetus? 
Do we look at the fetus' right to live as 
primary, or do we consider the effect of 
that life on others as primary? Anthony 
Smith, in The Human Pedigree 
suggests: "With the courts, and plaintiffs 
and defendants, and hard cash and pub-
licity all involved, the fetus is joining the 
society of which it is a part earlier than 
ever before." The speculation is endless. 
What about fetal research? Since an 
aborted fetus prior to viability-at 
least-is not a "person," is that fetus 
then fair game for research? What about 
the future of our human race? Does man 
have an obligation to weed out, through 
genetic counseling, the imperfect 
fetuses? Smith states: 
We lavish intense care upon our in-
fants the moment they are born but 
have not expended thought upon the 
manner of their conception. There is a 
hidebound quality in our attitude that 
the genetic lottery of who mates with 
whom should be preserved at all 
costs .... If a third of our mental in-
stitution inmates are mongoloids, is it 
not strange that we do nothing to les-
sen that intake? 
What about amniocentesis, a method 
by which a small amount of amniotic 
fluid is extracted in the twelfth to six-
teenth week of pregnancy? This proce-
dure is not new; it has been used for 
years to determine Rh factor incompati-
bility between mother and fetus. It may 
involve fetal puncture, or it may induce 
abortion and fetal malformation; it may 
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cause infection and bleeding to the 
mother. Do we follow Margot Hentoff's 
"Ethics of Convenience"? One doctor 
has said: "The final arbiter of what chil-
dren should be born is the parents them-
selves. Only they know what is best for 
their marriage. I don't have any hesita-
tion in cooperating with an abortion if 
both parents want only girls and the cur-
rent pregnancy tests out by amniocen-
tesis to be a boy." Mr. Richard Restak 
believes that doctors like this one see 
parents as consumers. Is the real point of 
the whole argument that a fetus is a part 
of a woman's body until it is born? 
"Anti-abortion laws give fetuses rights 
that living people don't enjoy. No hu-
man's right to life includes the use of 
another human being's body and life-
support systems against that individual's 
will," says Jimmye Kimmey. 
The Edelin decision has already 
slowed down fetal research. And yet re-
search on fetuses has precipitated many 
benefits for our society. Fetal research 
cannot be divorced from the abortion 
issue because the fundamental question 
is the same: is the fetus human? Either 
the fetus is human or it's not. If the courts 
decree the pre-viable fetus non-human 
for abortions, then it should be non-
human for research purposes. A number 
of states have adopted statutes which 
limitfetal research. In July of 1974, Pub-
lic Law 93-348, Title II - Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research, established a Na-
tional Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research. 
In May of 1975 the Commission is-
sued a comprehensive report on the use 
of the living fetus in biomedical research. 
It outlined the gUidelines to be used in 
therapeutic research on fetuses, preg-
nant women, fetuses in utero, and in an-
ticipation of abortion, as well as non-
therapeutic research directed toward the 
nonviable fetus ex utero, the fetus during 
an abortion, and the possibly viable in-
fant. A report was issued in August of 
1975, "Protection of Human Subjects: 
Fetuses, Pregnant Women and In Vitro 
Fertilization." FED. REG. 33526. The re-
port attempts to give clear definitions of 
every word a subject of the report; addi-
tionally, it discusses the concept of con-
sent to research in great detail. What is 
especially interesting is the composition 
of the Commission. It is composed of 
eleven members: an obstetrician-
gynecologist, an internist, a pediatrician, 
two physiological psychologists, two law 
professors, one practicing attorney, two 
ethicists (one a Catholic priest), and the 
president of a national black women's 
organization (a good cross-sectional rep-
resentation of people well qualified to 
consider the subject with one exception: 
only one woman). 
The fundamental source of our confu-
sion about abortion is the Right to Life 
movement. There have always been 
Right to Lifers, I expect-Wertheimer's 
"conservatives". However, until the 
Roe/Doe decisions, no one paid much 
attention to them. Richard Steele of 
Newsweek calls abortion "1976's 
Sleeper Issue". The Right to Lifers even 
had their own candidate: an unknown 
housewife named Ellen McCormack, 
running on an anti-abortion ticket. There 
have been over thirty proposed 
amendments to the Constitution at-
tempting to make abortion unconstitu-
tional. They are of two types: "states' 
rights" amendments, and "affirmative" 
or Life-Protective amendments. An "af-
firmative" amendment would require 
recognition of the unborn as individuals; 
a "states' rights" amendment would 
give the states that option. 
Those who argue that a fetus is human 
from the moment of conception argue 
that the premise on which the Roe/Doe 
decisions was decided is faulty; they con-
tend that it is not evident from the Con-
stitution that the word "person" 
excludes the unborn. They think that the 
burden is on those arguing exclusion, 
not on those arguing inclusion. One of 
the strongest pro-life arguments is made 
by Robert A. Destro: "[If] the 'compel-
ling' point at which the state may exert its 
interests in the protection of the lives of 
the unborn is placed at viability, that 
point moves closer to the time of concep-
tion with each development in the 
treatment of prenatal and neonatal 
problems." The National Right To Life 
movement claims more than a million 
active members; it is not the only pro-
life group. They are making themselves 
heard; how effective their volume will be 
remains to be seen. 
An easy solution to the multi-faceted 
issue of abortion is not likely, either now 
or in the near future. It will take time to 
reconcile Jan Leibman, of the National 
Organization for Women, when she 
says, "No woman should ever be forced 
to be her husband's brood mare. The 
woman is the one who carries the fetus 
and gives birth to it, so she should be the 
only one to decide whether to carry it to 
term" with Barry Goldwater when he 
says, "I don't want to see promiscuous 
abortion. If a life is in danger, abortion is 
okay, but otherwise the Pill ought to be 
enough. If it isn't, they ought to learn to 
say no." Wertheimer sums up the argu-
ment by saying that each side's positipn 
is equally weak and equally strong: 
The liberal asks, "What has a zygote 
got that is valuable?" and the conser-
vative answers, "Nothing, but it's a 
human being, so it's wrong to abort 
it." Then the conservatives asks, 
"What does a fetus lack that an infant 
has that is so valuable?" and the lib-
eral answers, "Nothing, but it's a 
fetus, not a human being, so it is all 
right to abort it." 
And round and round we go. 
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